Data Broker Radaris Loses Domains in Privacy Fight

Radaris, a consumer data broker, faced a lawsuit alleging violations of New Jersey privacy law (Daniel’s Law) related to publishing personal information on state law enforcement officials. The legal dispute involved Atlas Data Privacy Corp, which sued Radaris in February 2024. Radaris's defense involved claims of defamation against reporters who investigated the co-founders, Igor and Dmitry Lubarsky, alleging they were Russian-born brothers operating various people-search services. Subsequent reporting revealed that Radaris allegedly used a fictitious CEO pseudonym and sought money from investors using these fake identities. The legal proceedings involved complex maneuvering by Radaris's attorneys regarding domain ownership and liability, with the court ultimately ordering transfers of domains to the plaintiffs. Evidence provided by Atlas included emails suggesting that multiple entities were managed by a small group operating across various shell companies. The legal action resulted in the transfer of several domain names from the Radaris family to Atlas, and defendants faced potential fines under Daniel's Law.

The narrative reveals a systemic pattern where powerful entities, in this case, data brokers operating across international jurisdictions, employ procedural delay, legal obfuscation through shell corporations, and strategic litigation to evade accountability for privacy violations. The repeated maneuvering described—the "island-hopping phase" involving shifting ownership between entities like the Marshall Islands and British Virgin Islands—suggests a strategy designed not just for short-term evasion but for long-term dissipation of liability. The conflict highlights a fundamental tension: the gap between legal formalism (where domain transfers occur) and substantive reality (where actual control and data flow reside). The system appears to favor entities capable of managing complex jurisdictional boundaries, as evidenced by Atlas's success in tracking the underlying operational network through email evidence. This pattern implies that meaningful protection for individuals requires mechanisms that supersede arbitrary corporate structures and jurisdictional barriers, which is why the focus must shift from individual domain transfers to establishing enforceable cross-border accountability for data processing itself. The persistence of this structure suggests a broader failure of regulatory frameworks to effectively manage surveillance capitalism operating in a globalized digital space.