With Abelardo de la Espriella set to become Colombia’s new president on Friday, his relationship with neighboring Venezuela is increasingly under scrutiny.
Colombia shares a more than 1300 mile land border with Venezuela, which is undergoing a complex political shift after Nicolás Maduro’s capture by the United States in January.
Latin America Reports spoke with analysts to understand what relations between the two nations may look like in the months and years to come.
Deputy director of the School of International Studies at the Central University of Venezuela, Maiger Dalay Urbina Romero, identified three key areas of focus for de la Espriella with regards to Venezuela: border security, investment, and the energy sector.
Border security has become a key issue due to the presence of armed groups along the border, in particular the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Maduro’s arrest has also ushered in a new interest in the Venezuelan market among Colombian business leaders; at least 17 companies in sectors such as energy, commerce, and aviation have sought to participate in recent months in the economic recovery underway in Venezuela.
Urbina Romero believes that Washington will play a fundamental role in bilateral relations due to its influence on the government of Delcy Rodríguez and close ties with de la Espriella.
“The backbone of these issues stems not only from the interests of both countries but also from the clear presence and influence of the United States of America in both administrations. It is foreseeable that this will be the focus of attention and that, based on these issues, pragmatic political relations will be built,” he said.
This analysis aligns with that of the consulting firm Colombia Risk Analysis, which reported a few days ago that de la Espriella will not have much autonomy in his relations with Caracas, which will instead be coordinated by the Donald Trump administration.
“Colombia’s room to maneuver in influencing Venezuela’s political developments will remain limited, and bilateral cooperation will depend primarily on the agreements the United States deems compatible with its priorities regarding security, energy, and migration,” said a report by the consultancy. “Consequently, Bogotá will likely act as a facilitator of an agenda defined by third parties,” it added.
Migrants at risk
Another key issue is migration; Colombia is home to the largest number of Venezuelan migrants; of the nearly 7 million citizens who emigrated as a result of the Venezuelan crisis, some 2.8 million are in Colombia.
Urbina Romero warns that de la Espriella pledged crackdown on insecurity and criminal groups could infringe on the rights of Venezuelan migrants. there will be a trend toward a more restrictive approach to public policy, which has an impact on Venezuelan migrants.
“There is a high risk that migrants will be criminalized,” said the academic.
He explained that de la Espriella may link the issue of armed groups – “natural rivals of Abelardo’s administration”– to Venezuelan migrants.
Colombia Risk Analysis predicted that under de la Espriella’s administration, migration is likely to be treated as an issue of border control, internal security, and transnational crime.
It added that de la Espriella will likely pander to the U.S. agenda of border externalization, curtailing asylum, deportations, and route control.
Venezuelans in Colombia will also be more vulnerable, according to Colombia Risk Analysis, due to last year’s shuttering of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which funded programs supporting migrants. The report added that the Colombian state has a limited capacity to fill the gap left behind by USAID.
“Without a sustained immigration policy, irregular migration will increase costs in health care and education, limit tax revenue, exacerbate labor vulnerabilities, and make it easier for illegal economies to exploit migrants,” it warned.
The report added that in border areas, the lack of institutional support for migrants could enable armed groups to recruit, extort, and control movement at informal crossing points.
What about the economy?
Colombia and Venezuela have historically enjoyed close economic ties but in recent years, bilateral trade has been strained by border closures, sanctions, and Venezuela’s economic decline.
There are signs, however, that Colombian companies are betting on a return to prosperous relations.
Several companies spy opportunity in Venezuela following Maduro’s arrest. Airlines like Avianca and Wingo have already expanded operations while the D1 supermarket chain plans to expand its presence in the country.
Another major investment comes from the Nutresa food multinational which, according to reports by the newspaper El Colombiano, has authorized a tripling of its monthly exports to Venezuela.
Yet experts say that economic relations will not be normalized overnight.
“From a communications standpoint, it is foreseeable that there will be some distance and caution on the part of [Colombian] spokespersons – not only from the Foreign Ministry but also from national government officials,” said Urbina Romero. This is due to the threat of U.S. intervention, which the expert believes will loom over the relationship.
However he believes the opportunity spied by the private sector will eventually encourage the pro-business de la Espriella administration to improve economic ties with Venezuela.
“Given the pragmatism of certain sectors—especially the private sector, both in Colombia and Venezuela—it is quite likely that closer cooperation will emerge,” said the international relations expert.
Featured image description: Split image of Delcy Rodrigues (L) and Abelardo de la Espriella (R).
Featured image credit: Delcy Rodriguez via Estanislao Santos / Instituto PATRIA. Abelardo de la Espriella via @ABDELAESPRIELLA on X.
Facts Only
* Abelardo de la Espriella is set to become Colombia’s new president on Friday.
* Colombia shares a land border with Venezuela, spanning over 1300 miles.
* Maiger Dalay Urbina Romero identified border security, investment, and the energy sector as key focus areas for de la Espriella regarding Venezuela.
* Border security is an issue due to armed groups including the ELN and dissident FARC factions along the border.
* At least 17 Colombian companies in energy, commerce, and aviation have sought participation in the Venezuelan economic recovery.
* Maduro's arrest has increased interest from Colombian business leaders regarding the Venezuelan market.
* The United States is expected to play a fundamental role in bilateral relations due to its influence on the Venezuelan government and ties with de la Espriella.
* Colombia Risk Analysis reported that de la Espriella will have limited autonomy in relations with Caracas, which will be coordinated by the Donald Trump administration.
* Migration involves approximately 2.8 million Venezuelan migrants currently in Colombia.
* There is a risk that cracking down on insecurity could infringe upon the rights of Venezuelan migrants, leading to potential criminalization.
* Migration is likely to be treated as border control and internal security under the current administration's approach.
* The lack of sustained immigration policy risks increasing costs and vulnerabilities for migrants.
Executive Summary
Abelardo de la Espriella is set to become Colombia’s new president, bringing increased scrutiny to relations with Venezuela, which shares a long border with Colombia. Analysts focus on three areas for future relations: border security, investment, and the energy sector. Border security is complicated by armed groups like the ELN and dissident FARC factions along the border. The recent political shift in Venezuela has spurred interest from Colombian business leaders, with several companies exploring economic recovery opportunities in Venezuela's markets across sectors like energy, commerce, and aviation.
Experts suggest that United States influence will be a fundamental factor shaping bilateral relations, as the U.S. has ties with both de la Espriella and Venezuelan officials. This dynamic implies that practical political relations will likely depend on agreements deemed compatible with U.S. priorities concerning security, energy, and migration. Furthermore, the presence of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia raises concerns regarding potential impacts on their rights and status, particularly if the administration adopts a more restrictive policy. Economic cooperation is seen as possible due to private sector interest, though experts anticipate caution from government officials due to perceived external threats.
Full Take
The narrative pivots on the tension between sovereign political action, external geopolitical influence, and transnational human realities. The analysis suggests that official bilateral engagement is constrained by a larger external agenda, specifically U.S. priorities regarding security, energy, and migration, positioning Bogotá as a facilitator of third-party agendas rather than an autonomous actor. This structure implies that the perceived 'pragmatism' sought by private economic interests may be secondary to externally defined parameters for cooperation.
The framing surrounding Venezuelan migration reveals a significant pattern: insecurity and border control are framed not just as domestic security issues but as mechanisms that can directly impact the rights of vulnerable populations, particularly migrants. The prediction that armed group issues will be linked to migrant concerns suggests a strategic convergence where internal security policies become tools for managing transnational flows. Furthermore, the anticipation that migration will be managed through externalized border control, curtailing asylum and deportations, highlights how global policy dictates local humanitarian outcomes.
The economic component displays an interesting duality: private sector incentives are actively seeking engagement despite expert warnings about political caution driven by potential U.S. intervention. This suggests a separation between private transactional opportunities and the state's capacity for independent strategic maneuvering. The underlying pattern is one where established state relationships are being reconfigured not by internal negotiation, but by superimposed external powers that prioritize specific geopolitical outcomes—security, control, and migration management—over purely reciprocal economic interests. What shifts when the narrative moves from economic recovery to enforced border policy? What mechanisms exist for ensuring that those prioritizing state-defined agendas do not disproportionately burden vulnerable populations?
Sentinel — Human
The text exhibits the structure and thematic depth typical of journalistic analysis, synthesizing expert commentary on complex bilateral relations rather than presenting purely factual data.
