Zahkung Ting Ying: Rise and Fall of the Rare-Earth Warlord in Myanmar
Zahkung Ting Ying: Rise and Fall of the Rare-Earth Warlord in Myanmar
Executive Summary:
- Zahkung Ting Ying led the Myanmar government-sponsored Kachin Border Guard Force (BGF), controlling a semi-autonomous, resource-rich region near the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He used this territory to develop illegal but highly lucrative poppy cultivation, timber, and rare-earth mining operations.
- In late 2024, the rival Kachin Independence Army (KIA) defeated Ying’s militias and dissolved his semi-autonomous fiefdom, forcing Ying to flee to the PRC after the KIA took over administration of his former territories.
- Ying, however, remains an influential figurehead, recently resurfacing with Myanmar junta officials to pledge support for the junta-sponsored national elections, and continuing to operate his lucrative illicit businesses.
Zahkung Ting Ying led the now-disbanded Myanmar government-sponsored militia, the Kachin Border Guard Force (BGF). Formerly known as the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), Ying’s militias controlled a semi-autonomous, resource-rich region in the Christian-dominated Kachin State, bordering the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Yunnan province. Ying was notable for developing illegal business ventures spanning from drug production to rare-earth mining (Frontier Myanmar, August 1, 2025).
Poppy cultivation soared under Ying’s supervision, and illicit extraction of rare earth elements (REE) proved lucrative for his militias in the Kachin BGF-controlled territories. In November 2024, his Kachin fiefdom was dissolved by the rival ethnic rebel group, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), after a months-long military offensive that defeated all three battalions of the Kachin BGF (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024; The Irrawaddy, November 29, 2024).
Despite fleeing from the KIA offensive—allegedly to the PRC—Ying has resurfaced and has been seen interacting with Myanmar junta officials. His business ventures are also partially operational despite the complete annihilation of his militias, making him a still-influential militant figurehead in Myanmar's ethno-politics (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
Rebel Leader, Collaborator, Fief Lord, and Politician
Very few details exist about Ying's early life—even his date of birth is not confirmed. Ying is also known as S’Khon Tein Yein and belongs to the Tibeto-Burman Ngochang ethnic minority group (BNI, November 2, 2024). He is married to Zahkung Ying Sau, and the couple has four children: three sons, Ying Sau, Ying Chan, and Ying Ting, and a daughter, Ying Myaw. All of his children are engaged in his illicit business ventures. His eldest son, Ying Sau, was also the NDP-K vice chair when the party was initially formed (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
In his youth, Ying joined the KIA—one of Myanmar's oldest ethnic insurgent armies— rising to become its junior commander. In 1968, he defected from the KIA to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Due to internal clashes and ethnic differences, the CPB was disbanded in an internal coup in 1989, and four ethnic armies subsequently formed from its ranks (The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2020; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
The NDA-K was one of these armies. The group was co-founded by Ying and his comrades, Layawk Zelum and Ying Zelum, both of whom were ex-KIA officers. [1] NDA-K was formed to fight for the security and socio-economic development of minority groups within Kachin State (The Irrawaddy, November 14, 2019). Ying rose to become the sole commander of the NDA-K and decided to join hands with the Sit-Tat, Myanmar’s most powerful institution, to convert the NDA-K into a special police force. In exchange for this loyalty, he received a government budget, salary, rations, and military equipment (Mizzima, October 23, 2017). In 1994, his militia forces were also rewarded control of a semi-autonomous region adjacent to the Myanmar–PRC border, which became known as Kachin State Special Region-1 (SR-1) (BNI, September 24, 2015; The Irrawaddy, November 29, 2024). As the Chairman of the Kachin State SR-1, Ying controlled resource-rich areas consisting of Chipwi, Tsawlaw, Pangwa, Kanpiketi, and Waingmaw townships. These areas are currently a lucrative hub for timber and REE mining (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
In 2010, Ying ran for the upper house constituency No. 05 as an independent candidate. This constituency covers the Chipwi, Tsawlaw, and Injungyang Townships, which then had a population of around 20,000. [2] He defeated his rival from the National Unity Party (NUP) amid allegations of ballot rigging and voter intimidation (BNI, September 24, 2015). During his first term as a lawmaker, he was photographed giving weapons to his Kachin BGF militias in an official ceremony in August 2012, which was widely seen as a move to incite violence against the KIA (Kachinnews.com, November 26, 2012). He was again re-elected in the upper house as an independent candidate in November 2015. In 2016, however, the Union Election Commission (UEC) of Myanmar ordered him to vacate his post in the upper house after he had been deemed guilty of electoral malpractice, violence, false accusations, and obstructing opposition parties and candidates during the 2015 electoral campaign (The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2020). His supporters reportedly attacked Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) candidate and their supporters and issued letters calling the NLD public enemies and invaders. Ying even accused Kyi of betraying her own people by marrying a British citizen (The Irrawaddy, June 25, 2016). In February 2019, Ying became the patron of the newly formed New Democratic Party of Kachin (NDP-K), which reportedly consisted of 8,000 members (The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2020; Myanmar Now, October 9, 2020).
Militias of Shan State Special Region 1
In 2009, the Sit-Tat started to pressure pro-military ethnic militias and police forces in the states in Myanmar’s periphery to integrate into its formal command structure under the new Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme. Despite resistance from a significant number of NDA-K officers and soldiers, Ying decided to comply with the orders, making the NDA-K the first militia to do so. The NDA-K was subsequently renamed to Kachin BGF (Frontier Myanmar, July 30, 2019).
At that time, Kachin BGF consisted of three battalions: 1001, 1002, and 1003 (Kachinnews.com, November 26, 2012). They were primarily based in the Chipwi, Pangwa, and Waingmaw townships (The Irrawaddy, October 15, 2024). Dissatisfaction with Ying’s move to fully integrate into the military command structure, however, led many of its members to defect to the rival KIA. It was estimated that Ying commanded only 300-400 men in the Kachin BGF, down from the 1,000 he commanded in 2009 (The Irrawaddy, July 27, 2012).
Ying was given greater flexibility in his governance tactics and was able to consolidate profits from his illegal extraction of natural resources. Mangshang Ting Sau—a former NDA-K commander and the president of NDP-K—even became the Kachin State Minister for Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation following the 2021 coup in Myanmar. By collaborating with the Sit-Tat, Ying became powerful enough to control who could enter the SR-1 and who could not, as well as what they could and could not do within the special region (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
Wealth and Illegal Ventures
There are several business ventures and illegal channels through which Ying accumulated his illicit wealth. A 2005 leaked U.S. diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks described NDA-K as a group that “resembles nothing more than a tightly-controlled business cartel” (BNI, September 24, 2015). One of his early ventures was cultivating poppies. Notably, areas in the Kachin State under KIA control typically do not contain any poppy fields. It is only the areas controlled by the Tatmadaw and Ying’s militias that cultivated poppy and reaped financial benefits from opium production (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Locals had to pay an annual tax of CNY 100 (about $15) to Ying and the military to cultivate poppies (Frontier Myanmar, January 5, 2022). [3] This patronage of poppy production led to Kachin anti-drug civil society organizations like Pat Jasan to stage protests against Ying and his militias in front of his home in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State (The Irrawaddy, June 25, 2016).
Ying also set up cross-border timber trade and logging business ventures with the PRC. Kachin SR-1 experienced rapid deforestation as large numbers of trees were cut for Ying’s timber business (BNI, September 24, 2015; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). He was also involved in facilitating the trafficking of high-value wildlife and exotic animal products from Myanmar to the PRC through the territory he controlled (Frontier Myanmar, August 11, 2022).
Over time, Ying became involved in a new, far more lucrative venture in REE mining. Between 2019 and 2023, he expanded the rare-earth mines around the towns of Pangwa and later Chipwi, leveraging Kachin State’s remoteness and semi-autonomous status (Frontier Myanmar, May 2, 2023; Frontier Myanmar, August 1, 2025; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). This created a layer of impunity to his REE mining venture, which is officially illegal under Myanmar’s law (Global Witness, August 9, 2022). Watchdogs such as Global Witness documented the boom in heavy REE mining in Kachin State. Satellite imagery revealed that the number of mining sites in the region reached over 300 in 2023, a rise of more than 40 percent since 2021 (Global Witness, May 23, 2024). This expansion was primarily seen around the border town of Pangwa, and in 2023 alone, revenues from REE sales in Kachin State totaled $1.4 billion (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024).
Ying’s illicit mining involves a complex web of local companies. These include Sin Kyaing Company, Myanmar Myo Ko Ko Medical Instrument Company Limited, Chang Yin Khu, and San Lin, among others, which serve as fronts for Chinese investors (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Instead of applying for permission to mine from Myanmar's central government, Chinese investors often negotiate backroom deals to acquire mining permits. Ying's militias grant permits to mine on land that they often forcefully confiscate from local residents. Ying’s militias also issue immigration permits to Chinese workers in Kachin mines and local miners with separate identity cards (Global Witness, August 9, 2022). Furthermore, Ying imposed a tax on the export of rare earths moving from Kachin SR-1 to the PRC at international border posts.
KIA’s Military Offensive Against Zahkung
Ying’s primary rival has been the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA). This group fights for greater autonomy for Kachin State and promotes the idea of a democratically elected federal government in Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar- August 20, 2025). KIO/KIA is mostly composed of the Jinghpaw ethnic group, which has traditionally dominated the state's ethnic, social, and political landscape. In contrast, Ying’s militia has become popular among Kachin minority groups such as Lashi, Lisu, Law Waw, Zaiwa, and Rawang, who regard the Kachin BGF as their protector against KIO/KIA-led Jinghpaw domination (Myanmar Now, October 9, 2020; The Irrawaddy, December 9, 2024). Owing to political and intra-ethnic differences, Ying’s militias and KIA troops repeatedly clashed near SR-1 areas. Despite Ying’s local popularity, members of his militias have often defected to the KIA. Former militia members have accused Ying of prioritizing his businesses over the welfare of the people in the territory under his control (Frontier Myanmar, July 30, 2019).
In June 2024, Ying ordered forceful operations against the KIA and its allied pro-democratic People’s Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF is the military wing of Myanmar's National Unity Government (NUG) and has been in exile since the 2021 military coup (The Irrawaddy, October 15, 2024). Following Ying’s order, the KIA was able to completely crush Ying and his Kachin BGF in a continuous offensive from September to November 2024. The KIA captured and decapitated all the Kachin BGF Battalions and their unit headquarters (BNI, November 2, 2024). Yung ultimately fled the SR-1 to the PRC, and the KIA subsequently sealed off his residence. In November 2024, the KIA announced the abolishment of the Kachin State SR-1 and declared itself as the administrator of the territories formerly controlled by Ying (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024; November 29, 2024). This effectively marked the end of Ying’s tenure as one of Myanmar's oldest, richest, and most influential ethnic warlords.
Conclusion
There has been no counterattack by Ying and his militias thus far, which remain in disarray. In June 2025, his elder son, Sau, posted two video clips on Facebook indicating that Kachin BGF was preparing to retake the former SR-1. Such events are unlikely, however, since the KIA's offensive has deprived Sau’s father of his territory, as well as destroyed his militias (Frontier Myanmar, August 1, 2025).
Even so, Ying has continued to run his businesses by reinvesting the wealth he earned from rare-earth ventures into the gold mining, petroleum, and hotel sectors. It is reported that he and his family members are traveling to develop networks with influential people (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Ying flew from the PRC to Naypyidaw to meet with the junta’s border affairs minister. His son Sau has also reportedly offered donations to the Junta-aligned Kachin Chief Minister (Myanmar Now, December 11, 2024).
In September 2025, Ying pledged his support for the then-upcoming junta-sponsored national elections in Myanmar. The elections took place in three phases from December 2025 to January 2026 and were widely boycotted by most of the country's resistance groups (Kachin News Group, September 22, 2025). On the Facebook page Kachin SR-1, narratives promoting Ying and his family’s lost feudal empire have resonated (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Despite losing territory and hired goons, Ying has not given up.
Notes:
[1] Three other ethnic armies are the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA).
[2] Myanmar’s Upper House is called the “Amyotha Hluttaw/အမျိုးသားလွှတ်တော်”
[3] As of March 2026, 100 Chinese Yuan (CNY) was approximately equivalent to $14.39 and 30,362 to 30,415 Myanmar Kyat (MMK).
Zahkung Ting Ying led the now-disbanded Myanmar government-sponsored militia, the Kachin Border Guard Force (BGF). Formerly known as the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), Ying’s militias controlled a semi-autonomous, resource-rich region in the Christian-dominated Kachin State, bordering the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Yunnan province. Ying was notable for developing illegal business ventures spanning from drug production to rare-earth mining (Frontier Myanmar, August 1, 2025).
Poppy cultivation soared under Ying’s supervision, and illicit extraction of rare earth elements (REE) proved lucrative for his militias in the Kachin BGF-controlled territories. In November 2024, his Kachin fiefdom was dissolved by the rival ethnic rebel group, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), after a months-long military offensive that defeated all three battalions of the Kachin BGF (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024; The Irrawaddy, November 29, 2024).
Despite fleeing from the KIA offensive—allegedly to the PRC—Ying has resurfaced and has been seen interacting with Myanmar junta officials. His business ventures are also partially operational despite the complete annihilation of his militias, making him a still-influential militant figurehead in Myanmar's ethno-politics (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
Rebel Leader, Collaborator, Fief Lord, and Politician
Very few details exist about Ying's early life—even his date of birth is not confirmed. Ying is also known as S’Khon Tein Yein and belongs to the Tibeto-Burman Ngochang ethnic minority group (BNI, November 2, 2024). He is married to Zahkung Ying Sau, and the couple has four children: three sons, Ying Sau, Ying Chan, and Ying Ting, and a daughter, Ying Myaw. All of his children are engaged in his illicit business ventures. His eldest son, Ying Sau, was also the NDP-K vice chair when the party was initially formed (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
In his youth, Ying joined the KIA—one of Myanmar's oldest ethnic insurgent armies— rising to become its junior commander. In 1968, he defected from the KIA to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Due to internal clashes and ethnic differences, the CPB was disbanded in an internal coup in 1989, and four ethnic armies subsequently formed from its ranks (The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2020; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
The NDA-K was one of these armies. The group was co-founded by Ying and his comrades, Layawk Zelum and Ying Zelum, both of whom were ex-KIA officers. [1] NDA-K was formed to fight for the security and socio-economic development of minority groups within Kachin State (The Irrawaddy, November 14, 2019). Ying rose to become the sole commander of the NDA-K and decided to join hands with the Sit-Tat, Myanmar’s most powerful institution, to convert the NDA-K into a special police force. In exchange for this loyalty, he received a government budget, salary, rations, and military equipment (Mizzima, October 23, 2017). In 1994, his militia forces were also rewarded control of a semi-autonomous region adjacent to the Myanmar–PRC border, which became known as Kachin State Special Region-1 (SR-1) (BNI, September 24, 2015; The Irrawaddy, November 29, 2024). As the Chairman of the Kachin State SR-1, Ying controlled resource-rich areas consisting of Chipwi, Tsawlaw, Pangwa, Kanpiketi, and Waingmaw townships. These areas are currently a lucrative hub for timber and REE mining (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
In 2010, Ying ran for the upper house constituency No. 05 as an independent candidate. This constituency covers the Chipwi, Tsawlaw, and Injungyang Townships, which then had a population of around 20,000. [2] He defeated his rival from the National Unity Party (NUP) amid allegations of ballot rigging and voter intimidation (BNI, September 24, 2015). During his first term as a lawmaker, he was photographed giving weapons to his Kachin BGF militias in an official ceremony in August 2012, which was widely seen as a move to incite violence against the KIA (Kachinnews.com, November 26, 2012). He was again re-elected in the upper house as an independent candidate in November 2015. In 2016, however, the Union Election Commission (UEC) of Myanmar ordered him to vacate his post in the upper house after he had been deemed guilty of electoral malpractice, violence, false accusations, and obstructing opposition parties and candidates during the 2015 electoral campaign (The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2020). His supporters reportedly attacked Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) candidate and their supporters and issued letters calling the NLD public enemies and invaders. Ying even accused Kyi of betraying her own people by marrying a British citizen (The Irrawaddy, June 25, 2016). In February 2019, Ying became the patron of the newly formed New Democratic Party of Kachin (NDP-K), which reportedly consisted of 8,000 members (The Irrawaddy, August 13, 2020; Myanmar Now, October 9, 2020).
Militias of Shan State Special Region 1
In 2009, the Sit-Tat started to pressure pro-military ethnic militias and police forces in the states in Myanmar’s periphery to integrate into its formal command structure under the new Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme. Despite resistance from a significant number of NDA-K officers and soldiers, Ying decided to comply with the orders, making the NDA-K the first militia to do so. The NDA-K was subsequently renamed to Kachin BGF (Frontier Myanmar, July 30, 2019).
At that time, Kachin BGF consisted of three battalions: 1001, 1002, and 1003 (Kachinnews.com, November 26, 2012). They were primarily based in the Chipwi, Pangwa, and Waingmaw townships (The Irrawaddy, October 15, 2024). Dissatisfaction with Ying’s move to fully integrate into the military command structure, however, led many of its members to defect to the rival KIA. It was estimated that Ying commanded only 300-400 men in the Kachin BGF, down from the 1,000 he commanded in 2009 (The Irrawaddy, July 27, 2012).
Ying was given greater flexibility in his governance tactics and was able to consolidate profits from his illegal extraction of natural resources. Mangshang Ting Sau—a former NDA-K commander and the president of NDP-K—even became the Kachin State Minister for Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation following the 2021 coup in Myanmar. By collaborating with the Sit-Tat, Ying became powerful enough to control who could enter the SR-1 and who could not, as well as what they could and could not do within the special region (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025).
Wealth and Illegal Ventures
There are several business ventures and illegal channels through which Ying accumulated his illicit wealth. A 2005 leaked U.S. diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks described NDA-K as a group that “resembles nothing more than a tightly-controlled business cartel” (BNI, September 24, 2015). One of his early ventures was cultivating poppies. Notably, areas in the Kachin State under KIA control typically do not contain any poppy fields. It is only the areas controlled by the Tatmadaw and Ying’s militias that cultivated poppy and reaped financial benefits from opium production (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Locals had to pay an annual tax of CNY 100 (about $15) to Ying and the military to cultivate poppies (Frontier Myanmar, January 5, 2022). [3] This patronage of poppy production led to Kachin anti-drug civil society organizations like Pat Jasan to stage protests against Ying and his militias in front of his home in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State (The Irrawaddy, June 25, 2016).
Ying also set up cross-border timber trade and logging business ventures with the PRC. Kachin SR-1 experienced rapid deforestation as large numbers of trees were cut for Ying’s timber business (BNI, September 24, 2015; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). He was also involved in facilitating the trafficking of high-value wildlife and exotic animal products from Myanmar to the PRC through the territory he controlled (Frontier Myanmar, August 11, 2022).
Over time, Ying became involved in a new, far more lucrative venture in REE mining. Between 2019 and 2023, he expanded the rare-earth mines around the towns of Pangwa and later Chipwi, leveraging Kachin State’s remoteness and semi-autonomous status (Frontier Myanmar, May 2, 2023; Frontier Myanmar, August 1, 2025; Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). This created a layer of impunity to his REE mining venture, which is officially illegal under Myanmar’s law (Global Witness, August 9, 2022). Watchdogs such as Global Witness documented the boom in heavy REE mining in Kachin State. Satellite imagery revealed that the number of mining sites in the region reached over 300 in 2023, a rise of more than 40 percent since 2021 (Global Witness, May 23, 2024). This expansion was primarily seen around the border town of Pangwa, and in 2023 alone, revenues from REE sales in Kachin State totaled $1.4 billion (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024).
Ying’s illicit mining involves a complex web of local companies. These include Sin Kyaing Company, Myanmar Myo Ko Ko Medical Instrument Company Limited, Chang Yin Khu, and San Lin, among others, which serve as fronts for Chinese investors (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Instead of applying for permission to mine from Myanmar's central government, Chinese investors often negotiate backroom deals to acquire mining permits. Ying's militias grant permits to mine on land that they often forcefully confiscate from local residents. Ying’s militias also issue immigration permits to Chinese workers in Kachin mines and local miners with separate identity cards (Global Witness, August 9, 2022). Furthermore, Ying imposed a tax on the export of rare earths moving from Kachin SR-1 to the PRC at international border posts.
KIA’s Military Offensive Against Zahkung
Ying’s primary rival has been the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA). This group fights for greater autonomy for Kachin State and promotes the idea of a democratically elected federal government in Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar- August 20, 2025). KIO/KIA is mostly composed of the Jinghpaw ethnic group, which has traditionally dominated the state's ethnic, social, and political landscape. In contrast, Ying’s militia has become popular among Kachin minority groups such as Lashi, Lisu, Law Waw, Zaiwa, and Rawang, who regard the Kachin BGF as their protector against KIO/KIA-led Jinghpaw domination (Myanmar Now, October 9, 2020; The Irrawaddy, December 9, 2024). Owing to political and intra-ethnic differences, Ying’s militias and KIA troops repeatedly clashed near SR-1 areas. Despite Ying’s local popularity, members of his militias have often defected to the KIA. Former militia members have accused Ying of prioritizing his businesses over the welfare of the people in the territory under his control (Frontier Myanmar, July 30, 2019).
In June 2024, Ying ordered forceful operations against the KIA and its allied pro-democratic People’s Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF is the military wing of Myanmar's National Unity Government (NUG) and has been in exile since the 2021 military coup (The Irrawaddy, October 15, 2024). Following Ying’s order, the KIA was able to completely crush Ying and his Kachin BGF in a continuous offensive from September to November 2024. The KIA captured and decapitated all the Kachin BGF Battalions and their unit headquarters (BNI, November 2, 2024). Yung ultimately fled the SR-1 to the PRC, and the KIA subsequently sealed off his residence. In November 2024, the KIA announced the abolishment of the Kachin State SR-1 and declared itself as the administrator of the territories formerly controlled by Ying (The Irrawaddy, October 23, 2024; November 29, 2024). This effectively marked the end of Ying’s tenure as one of Myanmar's oldest, richest, and most influential ethnic warlords.
Conclusion
There has been no counterattack by Ying and his militias thus far, which remain in disarray. In June 2025, his elder son, Sau, posted two video clips on Facebook indicating that Kachin BGF was preparing to retake the former SR-1. Such events are unlikely, however, since the KIA's offensive has deprived Sau’s father of his territory, as well as destroyed his militias (Frontier Myanmar, August 1, 2025).
Even so, Ying has continued to run his businesses by reinvesting the wealth he earned from rare-earth ventures into the gold mining, petroleum, and hotel sectors. It is reported that he and his family members are traveling to develop networks with influential people (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Ying flew from the PRC to Naypyidaw to meet with the junta’s border affairs minister. His son Sau has also reportedly offered donations to the Junta-aligned Kachin Chief Minister (Myanmar Now, December 11, 2024).
In September 2025, Ying pledged his support for the then-upcoming junta-sponsored national elections in Myanmar. The elections took place in three phases from December 2025 to January 2026 and were widely boycotted by most of the country's resistance groups (Kachin News Group, September 22, 2025). On the Facebook page Kachin SR-1, narratives promoting Ying and his family’s lost feudal empire have resonated (Frontier Myanmar, August 15, 2025). Despite losing territory and hired goons, Ying has not given up.
Notes:
[1] Three other ethnic armies are the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA).
[2] Myanmar’s Upper House is called the “Amyotha Hluttaw/အမျိုးသားလွှတ်တော်”
[3] As of March 2026, 100 Chinese Yuan (CNY) was approximately equivalent to $14.39 and 30,362 to 30,415 Myanmar Kyat (MMK).